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Abstract 
This study examines which monetary aggregates, namely nominal M0, M1 and M2, 
can be used by the People’s Bank of China to conduct monetary policy. The model 
includes real M0, M1 and M2 as the dependent variable respectively and their 
determinants, such as real income, real inflation rate, and real rate of one-year saving 
deposit. Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) procedures are used to 
estimate the long-run relationship between the monetary aggregates and their 
variables. Short-run model is applied to M0, M1 and M2 respectively to see whether 
the error term is negative to validate the significance of the long-run relationship 
using the Ordinary Least Square estimation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The Chinese economy has been growing dramatically since the economic and 
financial reforms in the late 1970s. The nominal GDP growth rate is relatively high 
compared to other developing countries, and the foreign reserve reached over $1.5 
trillion by the end of 2007. In addition, the reforms have brought large changes to the 
Chinese banking system and its monetary management and policies.  
 
1.1.1 The Chinese Banking Sector 
Before the economic reforms in 1978, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) acted as 
both commercial bank and the central bank. It transferred funds from savers to 
borrowers, and also set the state production plans in each production sectors for the 
Ministry of Finance. However, it did not generate any profits, implement any asset 
and liability management nor conduct monetary policy. The economical variables, 
such as exchange rates, interest rates and price level, were determined by the 
government (Yu and Xie, 1999). In 1984, the PBC became the central bank of China 
and four major commercial banks were established: the Agricultural Bank of China, 
the People’s Construction Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, the Bank of Communications, and the China International Trust and 
Investment Company Bank (Hafer and Kutan, 1994). Today these banks are known as 
the Bank of China, the People’s Construction Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of 
China, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China respectively. In the same 
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year, a reserve system was established to restructure the Chinese banking system. In 
addition, there are some smaller commercial banks, urban cooperative banks, 
non-financial institutions, and foreign bank branches in the Chinese financial system 
(Fang et al., 2000). In December 2006, China has committed to open up its financial 
system further under World Trade Organization accession agreement and foreign 
banks should have little barriers to compete with the Chinese banks. Therefore, the 
Chinese banks face tremendous pressure in attracting local businesses and 
maintaining profitability and solvency.   
 
1.1.2 Main Contours of Monetary Policy Development 
The evolution of monetary policy1 in China can be summarized as follows. In the 
1980s, the PBC used direct monetary control, such as credit quota control, difference 
control and monetary base control. In addition, China introduced a dual exchange rate 
system in 1981 and in the middle of 1990s, the dual exchange rate system was 
abandoned and a fixed exchange rate system (the PBC pegged the Chinese RMB 
against the US dollar) was introduced (Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 2007). Ping and 
Xiaopu (2003) argued there was no monetary policy in China before the 1990s and 
only credit quota control and government intervention were used in determining the 
economic variables. After 1993, the exchange rate, interest rate and tax rate were used 
mainly to control economic activities in the country. The credit quota control system 
was abandoned and the PBC implemented the reserve requirement, open market 
                                                        
1 The evolution of monetary policy will be discussed in much greater depth in Chapter 2.  
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operation and discount window to influence the economic activities in 1998. For the 
first time the PBC used monetary targeting to control the money supply from 1998. 
Furthermore, the regulations of capital inflows have been gradually removed since the 
early 2000s. Residents and nonresidents have been allowed to invest in B-shares, 
which are denominated and transacted in foreign currency but listed in China, since 
February 19, 2001. At the beginning of 2004, the PBC started to use interest rate 
instead of money targeting as the intermediate goal in conducting monetary policy 
(Dai, 2006). However, the consumer price index is still high as shown in Figure 1.1. 
The question remains whether monetary targeting should be reused to stabilize 
inflation.  
Figure 1.1 Consumer Price Index 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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In July 2005, the pegged exchange regime was removed. The RMB was revalued by 
2.1% and a managed float exchange rate system was adopted (Forssbæck and 
Oxelheim, 2007). In January 2007, the Shanghai inter-bank offer rate was introduced 
to build a money market benchmark interest rate system. At present, the PBC 
implements a tight monetary policy to restrain the rapid growth of money and credit, 
prevent high inflation and create sound monetary and financial environment (China 
Monetary Policy Report Quarter Four, p22, 2007).  
 
1.1.3 Inflation Cycle and Inflationary Expectations 
The credit decentralization and market reforms also accelerated inflation. Private 
firms were allowed to enter into the market and since government subsidies are only 
transferred to state firms, private firms started to seek high yield investments to 
decrease operational expenses. In return, they enjoyed high productivity growth. State 
firms, on the other hand, are subsidized by the government and any losses are covered 
by subsidies. Therefore, the state firms did not have incentives to invest in high yield 
investments, which led to low productivity growth. The difference between high and 
low productivity growth is called the productivity gap and the government tried to 
minimize the gap by allocating more credit to state firms. However, the government 
could not control the credit allocation adequately because banks allocated most of the 
credit to private firms to maximize their own profits whereas state firms only had 
small credits to invest. The government was forced to use money creation to supply 
more credits to state firms and finally, the output growth rate and the productivity gap 
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increased, which led to the increase in inflation. This process is circulatory (Brandt 
and Zhu, 2000). In addition, inflationary expectations in China changed the real 
interest rate expectations, which affected public savings and investment decisions 
including both money supply and money demand. Inflationary expectations affect 
people’s decision-making. If people expect high inflation, then they will try to spend 
more in the earlier stage. With spending on the rise, price levels will also start to 
increase. If there are low inflationary expectations, then people will save more. 
Figure 1.2 Movements in the Future Price Expectations and the CPI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: China Monetary Policy Report Quarter Three, 2007. 
 
The graph in Figure 1.2 shows the trend of the Index of Future Price Expectations 
moving in the same direction as the CPI’s and is highly correlated. The increase in the 
Index of Future Price Expectations drives up the CPI and vice versa. In the fourth 
quarter of 2007, the CPI reached about 6.5%, which was the highest since 2000. The 
high inflation rate reinforces inflationary expectations and keeps increasing because 
the CPI has been increasing since the third quarter of 2006. 
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Thus, the main task of the PBC is to decrease and stabilize the inflation rate. One way 
to achieve the task is to manage and monitor the growth rate of money supply in the 
country using money targeting. This thesis will attempt to test whether money 
targeting can be used by the PBC to conduct monetary policy. 
 
1.1.4 Theory of Money Targeting 
Money supply is defined as the total supply of money in circulation in a given 
country's economy at a given point of time. M0, M1, and M2 are commonly used to 
measure the total money supply in a country. The money supply is considered to be 
an important mechanism in controlling inflation.  
 
The quantity theory of money states that 
MV=PT                                                                    (1) 
where M is the total amount of money in circulation, V is the velocity of money, P is 
the price level and T is the level of transactions. It is difficult to measure or record total 
transactions but the GDP can measure both aggregate income and expenditure in an 
economy. Thus we replaced the total transactions by GDP ( y ). Equation (1) can be 
rewritten as follows:  
MV=Py                                                                 (2) 
Rearranging Equation (2) yields the following:  
M/P=y/V                                                                (3) 
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Since V is quite stable and changes slowly and y is fixed in a certain period, the 
increase of money supply will lead to increase of price level. Therefore, inflation is a 
result of growth money supply. The central bank sets an inflation target each year and if 
the actual inflation rate exceeds the target rate, the central bank will reduce the money 
supply in order to decrease the actual inflation rate and vice versa. Furthermore, 
Equation (3) also implies a necessary condition for using monetary targeting to control 
inflation, which is the stable demand function. In order to control the money supply, 
monetary authorities should decide which particular measure of money supply to target. 
The broader the measured target, the more difficult it will be to control that particular 
target. However, targeting an unsuitable money supply reduction measure may lead to a 
situation where the total money supply in the country is not adequately controlled. This 
research also investigates which monetary aggregates, namely real M0, M1, and M2, 
are stable in the long-run by constructing the money demand functions.  
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The research objectives of this study include the following: 
I. the research will test whether there is a positive or negative relationship 
between real income, real inflation, and one-year saving deposit rate and 
monetary aggregates, namely real M0, M1, and M2, in the long-run 
II. the research will test which determinants are cointegrated with real M0, M1 
and M2 respectively in the long-run  
III. an error correction model will be used to examine the short-run dynamics and  
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IV. the study findings will provide some policy implications to policy-makers to 
make better decisions on how to stabilize macroeconomic sustainability 
 
The research strategy for achieving these objectives is as follows. The first step is 
to construct the money demand functions for China with the real money demand as 
dependent variable and the determinants, such as real income, real inflation rate, 
and one-year saving deposit rate as independent variables for real M0, M1, and M2 
respectively. The second step is to use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to 
determine the degree of integration of each series. Following this, Johansen (1988) 
and Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) procedures will be applied to the data to 
estimate the long-run relationship between the money demand and its determinants 
in China. The last step is to determine how the adjustments are taking place among 
the variables to achieve the long-run equilibrium using the error correction model 
(ECM). 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter One provides an overview of the research problem statement and objectives. 
Chapter Two discusses the evolution of the Chinese monetary policy and will reviews 
some pioneer literatures, which estimate the demand for money in foreign countries 
and China respectively. Chapter Three explains the variable selection, model 
formulation, and the methodology used in the study. Following this, Chapter Four 
presents a discussion of the empirical results and findings and Chapter Five provides 
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the conclusions of the research findings, policy implications, limitations and 
recommendations for future research.      
 
 
 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 The Evolution of the Chinese Monetary Policy 
The Chinese monetary policy has undergone different stages of development in terms 
of objectives, intermediate goals, and monetary tools. In addition, China switched 
from the centrally planned economy to market economy since the financial reforms in 
the late 1970s and replaced the direct monetary management by indirect monetary 
management in 1993 (Yu and Xie, 1999). Furthermore, its exchange rate regime 
experienced different development stages, such as an administrative exchange system, 
a dual exchange rate system, a managed float system with a narrow band and a 
managed float system with a very narrow band (Huang and Wang, 2004). The old and 
new trading systems, along with different exchange rate regimes, were abolished and 
introduced respectively. Significant progress has been made in controlling monetary 
base. Money market and capital market were gradually developed. The evolution of 
the Chinese monetary policy is discussed as follows in chronological order.  
 
Before the financial reforms, the PBC was a mono-bank transferring funds from 
savers to borrowers, and used direct monetary management to conduct monetary 
policy. Direct monetary management, also called credit quota control, was used to set 
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the state production plans in each production sectors for the Ministry of Finance and 
it comprises the credit and the cash plans. The credit plan has two forms: enterprise 
and financial credit. The former was extended to finance transitory phenomena and 
the latter was extended to finance budget deficits. The cash plan sets the target for 
currency in circulation and commercial banks implemented the target (Feltenstein and 
Farhadian, 1987). However, the system was inefficient and ineffective. For example, 
credit allocation did not allocate credit resources efficiently, which led to a bank’s 
liabilities exceeding its assets. Firms could also obtain more credits from other 
channels, such as foreign sources, capital markets, and informal channels and 
therefore banks no longer monopolize credit plans. Banks did not follow the credit 
constraint because the PBC could not effectively enforce credit disciplines. In the late 
1970s, China had an administrative exchange system, which was used to support the 
centrally planned economy. The official exchange rate was linked to a basket of 
currencies. Foreigners were allowed to exchange currencies using Foreign Exchange 
Certificates (Huang and Wang, 2004).  
 
In 1980, a new monetary tool called “Difference Control” was introduced to improve 
the flexibility of the credit plan. An estimated difference between credit expenditure 
and credit receipts was set by the PBC, and the total differences among all 
commercial banks were examined. If the actual differences do not exceed the 
estimated target, commercial banks could make more loans. The purpose of adopting 
this control was to pay more attention to asset management than to liability 
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management. However, the targeted difference was based on the actual differences of 
all commercial banks, and commercial banks started to increase their differences as 
much as possible by making more loans. Thus, the money supply was not controlled 
efficiently. China introduced a dual exchange rate system in 1981, and was defined as 
“an official rate for non-trade-related transactions and an internal settlement rate for 
authorized current account transactions.” (Huang and Wang, 2004). In a dual 
exchange rate system, there are both fixed and floating exchange rates in the market. 
The fixed exchange rate is applied to current account transactions, while the floating 
rate is determined by the movements of the currencies in the basket.     
 
In 1985, the internal settlement rate was abolished and all transactions were applied to 
the official rate (Huang and Wang, 2004). In the same year, the PBC introduced 
“Monetary Base Control”. Monetary base is the central bank’s liabilities equal to 
bank reserves plus currency in circulation. The PBC controlled the monetary base 
through three ways, the PBC loans to state banks, the PBC budgeting lending to the 
government, and the foreign exchange reserves. The lack of international accounting 
standards and auditing systems causing performances of bank branches were not 
monitored closely by headquarters, asymmetric information between the PBC, 
branches, and headquarters was prevalent. Therefore, the bank management of both 
assets and liabilities got worse. The PBC had to extend liquidity because banks’ loan 
portfolio and capital positions were deteriorating. Currently, the PBC has abandoned 
the budget lending to the government because the government has generated more 
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taxes based on a better tax collection system. Thus, this change has relieved the 
PBC’s financial burden and it reinforced both fiscal and monetary policy (Yu and Xie, 
1999).  
 
In 1986, China reintroduced the dual exchange rate system after establishing the 
special economic zones. Domestic and foreign firms in the zones were allowed to 
trade foreign currencies at negotiated exchange rate in Foreign Exchange Adjustment 
Centers (the swap center). However, under this mechanism, China had one official 
exchange rate and many market exchange rates. The gap between the two rates and 
the volatility of market rates increased (Huang and Wang, 2004).  
 
In 1994, the dual exchange rate system was abandoned and a managed float exchange 
rate system with a narrow band (the pegged system of the Chinese RMB with the US 
dollar) was introduced (Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 2007). All foreign transactions 
were traded at RMB 8.7 per US dollar. This rate was allowed to fluctuate by 2.5% 
of the previous day’s reference rate. In the same year, a new trading system along 
with the new exchange rate regime, called the China Foreign Exchange Trade System, 
was introduced to replace the Foreign Exchange Certificates. The narrow band, 
2.5%, was further decreased during the Asian financial crisis (Huang & Wang, 
2004). Owing to the changes of exchange rate regime and policy, foreign reserve 
increased from 1.5% to 25% of the PBC’s total assets between 1985 and 1994. In 
order to absorb the huge increase in foreign reserves, the PBC used those foreign 


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exchanges to make loans. If firms export or import goods and services in foreign 
currencies, they must sell foreign currencies to or buy from commercial banks, then 
commercial banks trade those currencies with the PBC for domestic currency. 
Currently, the PBC allows firms to keep part of foreign currencies because using 
foreign exchanges to make loans becomes difficult (Yu and Xie, 1999). According to 
Ping and Xiaopu (2003), that there was no monetary policy in China before the 1990s 
and only credit quota control and government intervention were used in determining 
the economical variables. After 1993, exchange rate, interest rate and tax rate were 
mainly used to control economic activities. From 1998, monetary targeting was used 
in conducting monetary policy. 
 
Credit quota control was abandoned and the PBC started implementing reserve 
requirement, open market operation and discount window to influence economic 
activities (Yu and Xie, 1999). Further, the regulations of capital inflows have been 
gradually removed since the early 2000s. Residents and nonresidents have been 
allowed to invest in B-shares, which are denominated and transacted in foreign 
exchange but listed in China, since February 19, 2001. Dai (2006) argues that money 
targeting was not successful because of the unstable money demand function. 
Mookerjee and Peebles (1998) found that it was difficult to control money supply 
using reserve requirements and direct credit control. At the beginning of 2004, the 
PBC started using interest rate instead of money targeting as the intermediate goal in 
conducting monetary policy.   
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 The pegged system was removed in July 2005. The RMB was revalued by 2.1% and a 
managed float exchange rate system was adopted (Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 2007). 
At present, the PBC is using reserve requirement ratio, central bank base interest rate, 
rediscounting, central bank lending, open market operation and other policy 
instruments specified by the State Council to absorb excess liquidity in the banking 
sector, to maintain the value of the currency and to promote economic growth (China 
Monetary Policy Report Quarter Four, p50, 2007).  
 
2.2 Money Demand in Foreign Countries 
Sriram (2002) applied monthly data from August 1973 to December 1995 in Malaysia 
and found that real M2 was quite stable in both the long and short-run using the Error 
Correction Models (ECMs). The opportunity cost of holding money includes 3-month 
time deposits with the commercial banks (own rate on money), discount rate on 
3-month government securities (alternative rate on money) and expected inflation. A 
dummy variable (DINTS) was introduced to reflect administrative control and market 
determination of interest rates. Another dummy variable capturing government 
control over excess liquidity in the banking system in January 1994 was also included 
in the Sriram’s model. The long-run income elasticity is close to one which suggests 
the financial system is well-developed. Sriram also identified that economic 
fluctuations and massive capital inflows during 1985-1987 and 1993-1995 did not 
impact on the stability of real M2 in Malaysia. Furthermore, Sriram addresses four 
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points in formulating a suitable money demand function. First, one must identify any 
alternative assets available to hold money. Then, it is necessary to know the liquidity 
of the money market and the capital market. Third, are interest rates adjusted by 
market forces or the government? Finally, how fast is financial innovation taking 
place?  
 
Dahalan, Sharma and Sylwester (2005) compared divisia M1 and M2 (DM1 and 
DM2) with simple sum M1 and M2 (SM1 and SM2) in Malaysia using quarterly data 
from 1976 to 2001. The authors used the Error Correction Model and money demand 
determinants, such as inflation, income, domestic and foreign interest rates and 
financial wealth to formulate long and short-run relationships. The test statistics ( 2 ) 
suggest that foreign interest rates for SM1, financial wealth and foreign interest rates 
for SM2 and inflation, domestic and foreign interest rates and financial wealth for 
DM1 and the foreign interest rates for DM2 do not have long-run relationship with 
the money demand functions for SM1, SM2, DM1 and DM2 because of the statistical 
insignificance. On the other hand, the statistical insignificance of the foreign interest 
rates does not indicate that the foreign influences are not important. Since Malaysia is 
a small open economy, the foreign influences on the money demand function may be 
caused by other channels, such as the exchange rates. Furthermore, the authors 
suggest that SM2 and DM2 could provide more information than SM1 and DM1 
because the test results are more plausible. DM2 does not exclude any domestic 
variables compared to SM2. Taken together, these results suggest that for Malaysia 
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divisia M2 is the best indicator to conduct monetary policy.  
 
In contrast to conventional money demand specifications, Hueng (1998) used the 
cash-in-advance model (CIA), which includes the foreign interest rate and the 
exchange rate in money demand function to test the demand for money in Canada 
using quarterly data for the period 1973:2-1991:1. There are three advantages in using 
CIA. First, it explicitly models liquidity services provided by money under the 
agent’s budget constraint instead of the utility function. Second, the CIA model 
considers the foreign interest rate and the exchange rate. Third, by applying the CIA, 
we can identify the effects of the interest rates on the money demand function. Hueng 
found that the real income is positively related to the money demand function, which 
suggests that an increase in income leads to an increase in money holding. Compared 
to the real income, domestic interest rate negatively impacts the holding of money 
because the opportunity cost of holding domestic currency increases if the domestic 
interest rate rises. Hueng also found that divisia M2 is related to the interest rates and 
the exchange rate. However, without considering these two variables, there will be 
misspecification in the money demand function. The author further suggested that the 
effectiveness of the monetary policy does not depend on the exchange rate system 
(fixed or floating), but people’s decisions to hold money plays an important role in 
the effectiveness of the monetary policy. Foreign monetary development affects 
people’s money demand. There are three main reasons that affect people’s money 
demand: 
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i. an increase in the foreign interest rate raises the opportunity cost of holding 
foreign currency. Thus, people prefer to hold more domestic currency and to 
withdraw foreign currency. 
ii. the absolute value of the foreign interest rate elasticity is larger than the 
domestic interest rate. This indicates that the movement of the foreign 
interest rate impacts the long-run money demand function of divisia M2 in 
Canada much greater than the domestic interest rate.    
iii. an appreciation of domestic currency increases the holding of domestic 
currency and vice versa. Therefore, the real exchange rate has a negative 
relationship with the money demand function.    
 
Narayan (2007) used the CIA to estimate the money demand function in Indonesia for 
the period 1970-2005. The author found that real M1 was negatively related to the 
domestic interest rate and the real exchange rate in the long-run. Real income and 
foreign interest rate are positively related to real M1; however, real M2 is only 
impacted positively by real income and negatively by the real exchange rate. There is 
no significant statistical relationship between real M2 and foreign interest rate. The 
negative relationships between real M1 and M2 and the real exchange rate suggest the 
evidence of currency substitution. In the short-run, there was only one causal 
relationship between the real exchange rate and real M1 and M2. Moreover, money 
targeting is not an option for Indonesia because of the unstable money demand 
functions.  
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 Different variables, data length and methodologies can lead to different outcomes 
following Narayan’s (2007) framework, Dekle and Pradhan (1999) approximated 
long-run money demand functions for the ASEAN-4 countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand and evaluated the cointegration functions from 1980 to 1995. 
The index of financial innovation was included in the demand functions to represent 
the changes in the velocity of money. The authors found the demand functions were 
stable, which means monetary targets can be used to conduct monetary policies. 
Furthermore, they pointed out that real money, income, interest rates and domestic 
and foreign prices with the nominal exchange rate are necessary conditions for a 
stable long-run money demand function in their findings.  
 
Hafer and Jansen (1991) employed cointegration tests to find out which monetary 
aggregate is preferable in the U.S. They used both the short-term interest rate 
(commercial paper rate) and the long-term interest rate (the corporate bond rate) in 
addition to real money balances and real income. In addition, to capture a wide 
variety of economic experiences, the authors used the data between 1915 and 1988, 
which includes two world wars, the Great Depression, and two stock market collapses. 
Further, in order to compare to other researches, another data period (1953-1988) was 
used in estimating the money demand function because those researches’ results focus 
on the post-war period. The estimation of the money demand function incorporates 
two different interest rates, namely the commercial paper rate (short-term interest rate) 
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and the corporate bond rate (long-term interest rate). Results using two interest rates 
are given as follows: 
i. the commercial paper rate: the trace test results suggest that the null 
hypothesis of at most one and two cointegrating vector(s) cannot be rejected 
for M1 and M2 over two periods. The null hypothesis of no cointegrating 
relationship for M2 is rejected in either period and it is only rejected for M1 
at the 10% level of significance in 1915-1988. The maximum eigenvalue test 
results suggest that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating relationship can 
be rejected in both sample periods for M2 but not for M1. Therefore, the two 
test statistics show that there is a long-run relationship between M2 and its 
determinants, whereas this relationship is plausible for M1. 
ii. the corporate bond rate: for M1, the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue 
test results suggest that there is no cointegrating relationship in 1953-1988. 
However, the maximum eigenvalue test results indicate that the null 
hypothesis of no cointegrating relationship cannot be rejected in 1915-1988. 
For M2, the null hypothesis of no cointegrating relationship cannot be 
rejected for the 1915-1988 results, whereas it can be rejected for the 
1953-1988 results; however, the maximum eigenvalue test results show that 
no cointegrating relationship is rejected in both sample period, which is 
consistent with the results from the commercial paper rate.    
Their results showed there was a cointegrating relationship among those variables but 
there was no strong evidence of cointegration relationship for M1. Thus, M2 is a 
 19
preferable measure to conduct monetary policy.  
 
Compared to Hafer and Jansen’s (1991) study, McNown and Wallace (1992) 
incorporated the effective exchange rate in formulating a broader demand for money 
(M2). In addition, the real GNP and nominal treasury bill rates are also included in 
formulating both M1 and M2. The quarterly data for the time period 1973:2 to 1988:4 
is used in the estimation. Tests of cointegration can be classified into three categories: 
i. the first category includes real M1 and M2 as dependent variable 
respectively and real GNP as independent variable. The null hypothesis of no 
cointegrating vector cannot be rejected for M1 using both 6 lags and 4 lags 
respectively. For M2, the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector can only 
be rejected when 6 lags is used. The evidence of cointegrating relationship 
does not exist when 4 lags is used.  
ii. the second category includes real M1 and M2 as dependent variable 
respectively, and real GNP and the interest rate as independent variables. For 
M1, the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector can be rejected when 6 
lags and 4 lags are applied. Thus, there is a long-run relationship among M1, 
real GNP and the interest rate. For M2, there is no strong evidence to suggest 
that there is any cointegrating relationship among M2, real GNP and the 
interest rate.  
iii. the final category only includes M2 as dependent variable. Real GNP, 
interest rate, and effective exchange rate are independent variables. For trace 
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  results, the null hypotheses of no cointegrating vector and at most 
one cointegrating vector can only be rejected using 6 lags. 
 
The coefficient of effective exchange rate is positive, which indicates the evidence of 
currency substitution. In order to achieve a stable M2 money demand function, the 
authors suggest that it is necessary to include the effective exchange rate in 
formulating the money demand function of M2. However, it is not the case for M1.   
 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Shabsigh (1996) used Johansen and Juselius’s procedure to 
estimate the long-run relationship between the real M1 and M2 and the real income 
and interest rate in Japan using quarterly data from the first quarter of 1973 to the 
fourth quarter of 1990. For M1, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected 
because the trace statistic is greater than its critical value at both 95% and 90% level 
and the max  statistic is also greater than its critical value but only at 90% level. 
However, the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating vector is not rejected. Thus, 
M1 has a long-run relationship with real income and interest rate. In contrast to M1, 
M2 does not have any long-run relationship with real income and interest rate 
because both test statistics are smaller than the critical values. Interestingly, in order 
to achieve the stability of M2, the effective exchange rate of the Yen should be 
included in the estimation. By adding the effective exchange rate, the null hypotheses 
 21
of no cointegrating and at most one cointegrating vector are rejected. Thus, there are 
two cointegrating vectors among M2, real income, interest rate and the effective 
exchange rate. Furthermore, the coefficient of the effective exchange rate is positive, 
which suggests an evidence of currency substitution.     
 
2.3 Money Demand in China 
Feltenstein and Farhadian (1987) constructed two models to measure the changes in 
money supply and real money balances for the period 1954-1983. In the first model, 
they employed the government deficit, wage bill of the government and enterprises, 
and procurement payments to farmers in their money supply function. Their test 
results showed all coefficients of the variables have the correct signs and they could 
fully explain the changes in broad money. Further, in the second model, they found 
that the real money balance can be explained by real income and anticipated true rate 
of inflation. The income elasticity of real money balances is 1.373, which is greater 
than unity. This result implies that the velocity of money is not constant and the 
evidence of monetization process. In addition, the true rate of inflation is 2.5 times 
higher than the official rate. 
 
Chow (1987) used the quantity theory of money to explain the price level in China for 
the period 1952-1983. By taking the logarithms on ( / )P M Y  and regress  
on
ln P
ln( / )M Y , the coefficient of ln( / )M Y  is 0.2687, which means the change in 
ln( / )M Y  will lead to a less change in l . This is consistent with the quantity n P
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theory of money. However, 0.2687 is less the unity, and therefore, the velocity of 
money is not constant. The author also found the income elasticity is greater than 
unity, 1,162, which is not consistent with the quantity theory of money. 
 
Chen (1989) estimated the causal relationship between M0, M2, and M3 and 
indicators of macroeconomic performance, overall economic development, price 
stability, balanced budget deficits, and balanced trade deficits using the BVAR model. 
The author found that the bidirectional causality is from M0 to overall economic 
development, to the balanced budget deficits, and to the balanced trade deficits and 
the unidirectional causality is from the money supply to inflation. The author suggests 
that M0 is the best indicator in conducting monetary policy.     
 
Yi (1991) is the first researcher to discuss the monetization process during the 
Chinese economic reform. The author suggests that the monetization process can 
explain why the growth rate of money supply was greater than the sum of real GNP 
growth and inflation rate. There are five channels of the monetization process: 
i. the increase in transaction demands of firms and households require more 
money in the economy. 
ii. the introduction of the responsibility system in the agriculture sector led 
more farmers enter into marketplace. The government purchases goods from 
farmers using cash, which increases the demand for money. 
iii. the growth of township and village enterprises accelerates the demand for 
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iv. the rapid growth of private firms increases the demand for money. 
v. the development of free markets causes cash flow from urban areas to rural 
areas because farmers’ sales form a large percentage in free markets.   
 
During the period 1979-1984, the inflation rate was moderate because the 
monetization process absorbed the excess money in the economy. Further, the 
monetization process is the explanation for the non-constant velocity of money. The 
excess money could not be absorbed because the monetization process started to slow 
down in 1985 which resulted in higher inflation rate (Yi, 1991).  
 
Luke Chan, Cheng and Deaves (1991) used currency stock, real income, reported 
price level and interest rate to construct the Chinese money demand function. By 
using the ordinary least-squares estimation, the authors conclude that both interest 
rate and anticipated inflation were not significant in explaining the money demand 
function. Interestingly, the income elasticity is unity, which is not consistent with 
Feltenstein and Farhadian and Chows’ results.   
 
Hafer and Kutan (1994) applied cointegration tests to determine whether there was a 
long-run equilibrium relationship between nominal money balances, interest rates, 
prices, and real national income in China during the period of 1952-1988. The 
economy of China was centrally planned during that period. Hafer and Kutan’s study 
 24
also showed which monetary aggregate was a better indicator in conducting monetary 
policy. Two price measures, the official index of retail prices and the implicit national 
income deflator were used in Hafer and Kutan’s research. The real income was 
adjusted to: (1) nominal income deflated by the retail price index, and (2) the national 
income deflator. Their test results showed that when the official index of retail prices 
is used, there is no long-run equilibrium relationship between the money demand 
function and its determinants. However, a relationship between them exists when the 
implicit national income deflator is used. For M0, the results do not reject the unitary 
income elasticity hypothesis. Also, the results show that the long-run interest 
elasticity is zero. However, the results reject the price homogeneity (the long-run 
coefficient of price level is 2.48), which suggest that the changes in money demand 
and price level are not proportional and one percent increase in price leads a 2.48 
percent increase in the money demand for nominal M0. The income elasticity of M2 
is not unity (1.42), which indicates the evidence of monetization. Interestingly, the 
results of M2 do not reject the price homogeneity, which indicates that the demand 
for nominal M2 changes with the price level proportionally. Therefore, they suggest 
the broader measure, M2, is a preferable measure for implementing monetary policy.  
 
Huang (1994) employed M2, GNP, consumer retail sales price, and real interest rate 
on one-year term saving deposits for the period 1979-1990 and applied the Johansen 
and Juselius (1990) and Engel and Granger’s (1987) procedure to test whether there 
was any cointegration relationship among those variables. The results suggest there is 
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a long-run relationship and the income elasticity is 2.12. Further, the author used a 
recursive regression model to test the stability of all parameters. In addition, Huang 
tested the weak exogeneity of the independent variables by inverting the ECM model 
to test the significance of the error correction term. The insignificance of the model 
means the independent variables are exogenous. By doing so, the weak exogeneity of 
income and price was confirmed. Huang concluded that monetary targeting can be 
used in conducting monetary policy because of the stable long-run demand for money 
in China and to control the inflation rate under 10%, M2 should be growing no more 
than 37%.    
 
Qin (1994) estimated the demand for money in China by applying two different time 
period using quarterly data for 1978Q1-1991Q4 and annual data for 1952-1991. The 
author argued that since household savings are very sensitive to the change in both 
inflation and interest rates, inflation cannot fully represent money demand. Thus, Qin 
used real interest rates (one year bank deposit rate net of inflation) to represent the 
opportunity cost of holding money. Qin also argued that under the financial reforms, 
the large increase in income levels of both individuals and firms and state economic 
planning should be considered as part of transaction demands. Since national income 
and GDP ignore sales, the transfers of intermediate goods, and the effect of changes 
in income distribution, Qin constructed a monetization index (MI) by employing the 
price ratio of agricultural to industrial output deflators and the output ratio of the 
non-state-owned industry to the whole industry to overcome this problem. Further, 
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Qin used the annual rate of saving and loan ratio to capture the effects of the 
government investment plan. Since the sample size of 1978Q1-1991Q4 is small and 
unit root tests may not have much power to determine the degree of integration of 
each variable, Hendry’s general to simple reduction approach was employed to 
construct an error correction model. Then the Johansen’s (1988) procedure was used 
to check for weak exogeneity of the single equation obtained from the Hendry’s 
general to simple reduction approach. The author found that the annual saving rate 
and loan ratio was only significant in the short-run but not in the long-run. The 
interest rate is significant in both short and long-run, which means it should be 
considered when estimating the demand for money in China. In addition, MI is 
significant in the long-run because the long-run relationship embedded in the error 
correction term is identical when using two data sets.   
 
Chen (1997) applied cointegration tests to estimate the long-run money demand 
function in China during the period 1951-1991. By implementing both the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller procedure (ADF) and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin’s 
procedure (KPSS), the author showed that inflation was stationary and the real 
balance and output were non-stationary. The cointegration test suggests the real 
balance and output are cointegrated with the expected inflation by using M0 and M2 
respectively. The income elasticity of M0 is 1.4 to 1.5 and 1.8 to 1.9 for M2, which 
means the velocity of money is not constant, and the increase in income leads to a 
decrease in the velocity of money. Chen suggests if M0 is used to conduct monetary 
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policy, then M0 should grow between 24% and 25% to control the inflation rate under 
10%. If M2 is used, then the increase in M2 should not exceed 28% to 29%. 
Yu and Tsui (2000) compared simple-sum aggregates to the monetary services index 
(MSI) by using monthly data for the period 1984-1997. The purpose of this 
comparison was to find out whether MSI can also be used as a target variable when 
conducting monetary policy. They suggested MSI can fully represent the function of 
money, such as the medium of exchange or store of value. It also captures the effect 
of financial innovations. Furthermore, they found that MSI is better than simple-sum 
aggregates in estimating the long-run demand for money in China.  
 
In the 1980s, Feltenstein and Farhadian (1987) and Chow (1987) examined the 
Chinese economy by focusing on how the changes in price levels affect the money 
supply under a centrally planned economy regime. Both studies showed that the 
velocity of money is not constant but with different income elasticity (1.373 and 
1.162). Unfortunately, they did not explicitly estimate whether there exists any 
long-run relationship between money aggregates and the explanatory variables. In the 
1990s, researchers such as Hafer and Kutan (1994) and Huang (1994), focused on the 
estimation of the long-run money demand function in China using the Johansen and 
Juselius’s (1990) test. Both studies showed that M0 and M2 are recommended for 
implementing monetary policy. Qin (1994) introduced MI in estimating the money 
demand function in China and showed that money demand determinants can fully 
explain the money demand function. Yu and Tsui (2000) suggested that MSI is better 
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than simple-sum aggregates in setting monetary policy in China.  
 
Austin, Ward, and Dalziel (2007) used Terasvirta’s procedure to test the linearity of 
an error correction model of money demand against a smooth transition regression 
non-linear alternative in China. The authors found that the money demand function is 
difficult to estimate when the inflation rate exceeds 5%. In the theoretical model, 
productive private firms cannot obtain funds easily, which leads to a decrease in 
output. Their results show that income only positively impacts on real money balance 
under a high inflation regime, which is consistent with the theoretical model.    
 
In general, most studies estimated the money demand function with different 
variables, different data time period, and different testing methods, such as the unit 
root test, the cointegration test and the error correction model. Some of them tested 
the stability of parameters using the Hansen test and the recursive regression method. 
The results showed a positive relationship between money demand and income, and a 
negative relationship between money demand and interest rates. However, there is no 
study that focuses on which monetary aggregate is the best target variable comparing 
M0, M1, and M2 in estimating the Chinese money demand function. Furthermore, the 
longest data period of those studies is only up to 1997. 
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Chapter 3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Variable Selection 
The general specification for the long-term demand for money begins with the 
following functional relationship: 
( , )M f S OC
P
                                                              (4) 
Where M is the monetary aggregate in the nominal term, P is price, thus, M
P
 is the 
demand for real balances. S is scale variable. OC is the opportunity cost of holding 
money.  
 
Equation (4) states that the demand for real balances is a function of a scale variable 
representing economic activities and the opportunity cost of holding money. 
Therefore, it is important to select the appropriate and relevant variables in our 
empirical model to explain the demand for money. First, to model a money demand 
function, we need to decide which money aggregates should be used. Previous studies 
such as Chen (1989), Hafer and Kutan (1994), Huang (1994), and Chen (1997) have 
shown that the monetary policy can be conducted by using M0, M2, or both in China, 
but our study will use M0, M1, and M2 separately as monetary aggregates because 
the purpose of our study is to find out which monetary aggregates are stable in the 
long-run. Further, Dahalan, Sharma, and Sylwester (2005) suggested that divisia 
monetary aggregates work better than simple-sum aggregates. However, owing to 
data limitations, simple-sum M0, M1 and M2 will be used in our study. The consumer 
price index (CPI) will be used to represent P in Equation (4). 
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Second, a scale variable is used to represent economic activities. There are many 
variables which can be used as scale variables, such as real income, disposable 
income, consumption, and domestic absorption. However, many researchers use real 
income as a scale variable (see Hafer and Kutan 1994; Huang 1994; Qin 1994; and 
Chen 1997). GDP is a common proxy for income. Thus, real income will be used in 
our study.  
 
Third, the demand for an asset depends on its opportunity cost. Luke Chan, Cheng 
and Deaves (1991), Hafer and Kutan (1994), Huang (1994), and Qin (1994) argued 
that interest rates can be used as the opportunity cost of holding money. However, 
Hafer and Kutan (1994) argued that government rates, such as Treasury bill rates and 
government bond rates, do not exist in China and savings deposit rate is the best 
interest rate measure. Therefore, the one-year saving deposit rate will be used in our 
study. For example, if a one-year saving deposit rate is used in estimating money 
demand function, it is an own-rate on money M2, but it is an alternative rate on 
money M0. Some studies such as Chen (1997), Sriram (2002), and Austin, Ward, and 
Dalziel (2007) suggested that expected inflation can be used as opportunity cost of 
holding money. In addition, Honohan (1994) suggested that the expected inflation is 
highly correlated with the actual inflation. Therefore, actual inflation is used in our 
study as an additional variable to represent the opportunity cost of holding money.  
 
Fourth, Hueng (1998) argued that traditional money demand studies have ignored the 
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influence of foreign monetary developments which may influence the domestic 
demand for real money balances. Khalid’s (1999) study revealed that money demand 
in an open economy can be estimated by domestic income, foreign income, domestic 
interest rate, foreign interest rate, and some measure of exchange rate depreciation. 
However, the RMB was pegged to the US dollar until 2005, thus, the appreciation and 
depreciation of the RMB were quite small. Although the pegged system was removed 
in July 2005, the RMB is still under a managed exchange rate system, and it is not 
allowed to freely float. Chinese residents were not allowed to exchange the RMB into 
large amount of foreign currencies until recently. Thus, using the exchange rate in 
estimating the demand for money in China is not appropriate in our study. 
 
3.2 Model Formulation 
The formulation of the money demand function follows Chen’s (1997) study. Chen 
used M0, M2, and M3, national income, expected inflation, and retail price in his 
empirical model. Thus, our study uses Chen’s study using real income and actual 
inflation rate. Further, our empirical model adds one additional variable, namely 
one-year saving deposit rate, in estimating the money demand function in China. M3 
is replaced by M1 in our money demand functions. The money demand functions are 
estimated in log-linear form, nominal M0, M1, and M2 and real income are in 
logarithms; one-year saving deposit rate and the actual inflation rate are in levels. Our 
money demand functions are given as follows: 
11 12 13 14 010 yrLRM LRINC INF RINTR                                 (5) 
 32
21 22 23 24 021 yrLRM LRINC INF RINTR                                (6) 
31 32 33 34 032 yrLRM LRINC INF RINTR                             (7) 
Where , , and  are 0LRM 1LRM 2LRM 0ln M
CPI
    , 
1ln M
CPI
 
 , and 2ln MCPI
    ; 
LRINC ln is (real income); INF  is the real inflation rate; yrRINTR  is the real rate 
of one-year saving deposit and   is the error term. 
 
3.3 Expected Signs of Coefficients 
I. Real income is expected to be positively related to the money demand functions 
(Equation 5, 6, and 7) because as more real incomes increase the number of 
transactions in an economy and this increases people’s demand for money.  
II. The actual inflation rate is expected to be negatively related to the money demand 
functions because people tend to hold more physical assets rather than money 
with a higher inflation rate.  
III. The one-year saving deposit rate is expected to be negatively related to the money 
demand functions because an increase in domestic interest rate increases the 
opportunity cost of holding domestic money (Hueng, 1998). Therefore, people 
tend to hold less RMB when one-year saving deposit rate increases. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
Regression analysis is used to derive the money demand function (Equation 5, 6, and 
7). Unit root tests, cointegration analysis and error-correction model will also be 
conducted in regression analysis. The use of unit root tests is to ensure that all 
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variables are integrated of order one. Cointegration analysis and error-correction 
model are used to estimate the long-run money demand function (Equation 5, 6, and 7) 
and to derive short-run money demand functions (Equation 13, 14, and 15) 
respectively. Our study will follow this procedure to estimate the demand for money 
in China. 
 
3.4.1 Unit Root Tests 
It is common for time series to have increasing conditional means and variances over 
time. In other words, the series are not stationary and the estimations of the 
coefficients of the independent variables are biased. Therefore, before using 
cointegration tests, we need to find out whether the time series are stationary or not. If 
the time series are stationary in their levels but not in the first differences, then we 
cannot carry out the cointegration tests and vice versa because the cointegration tests 
require that all variables should be integrated of order one. Since many economic 
time series have complicated dynamic structure than other types of time series, the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test will be used to determine the degree of 
integration of each series (Oskooee and Shabsigh, 1996). 
 
To implement the ADF test, we estimate the following regression: 
1 1
k
t t i ti 1 t
Z a bT cZ d Z W                                             (8)    
Where  is the first difference operator; T is the time trend and w is a white noise 
error term. We test whether b is zero. Then ADF test statistic is calculated by dividing 

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the estimate of c to its standard error. 
 
Each of the variables used in our study will be tested for a unit root. The ADF tests 
the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative hypothesis of no unit root. 
The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if the calculated t statistic is less than the 
critical value. If the calculated t statistic is greater than the critical value, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected (Hafer and Jansen, 1991). For example, if we do not reject 
the null hypothesis in the log-level of each variable, then we will look at the 
first-difference of each variable; if the null hypothesis is rejected in each variable, we 
can conclude that all variables are integrated of order one. 
 
3.4.2 Cointegration 
Cointegration implies that the cointegrating variables are non-stationary but the 
linear-relationship between them is stationary and provides a statistical framework for 
developing the long-run relationship between the money demand and its 
non-stationary variables (Hafer and Jansen, 1991). 
 
In order to estimate the long-run relationship between the money demand and its 
determinants in China, Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) 
procedures are applied to the data. These procedures essentially provide maximum 
likelihood estimation with two test statistics,  and trace max  , and include the 
short-run dynamics in estimating the long-run money demand function. Further, we 
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can test for multiple cointegrating vectors and the restricted version of the 
cointegrating vectors.  
 
Johansen (1988) defined a distributed lag model of a vector of variables as follows: 
1 1 , 1, 2,...,t t k t k tX X X t                                         (9) 
Where X  is a vector of N stationary variables,   is a matrix of parameter, and t  
is an independently and identically distributed N-dimensional vector with zero mean 
and  variance matrix. 
If vector X  is non-stationary, then we need to differentiate it to first difference form, 
which is given as follows: 
1 1 1 1t t k t k t kX X X X t                                               (10) 
Where   for 1 2i i       1,2, 1i k   
And  1 2 k      
  is an  matrix and includes the number of r cointegrating vectors between 
the variables in 
N N
X , which provides information about the long-run equilibrium 
relationships among the variables. The rank of   shows the number of cointegrating 
relationships. matrix for the first-differenced variables in  1tX   contains the 
contemporaneous short-run adjustment parameters. 
 
Since cointegration requires that all variables are integrated of order one, the 
maximum rank of  should be one.    can be decomposed into the product of two 
q by r matrices   and   respectively such that   . The   matrix contains 
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the r cointegrating vectors. Then Johansen and Juselius (1990) demonstrated that   
can be estimated as the eigenvector associated with r largest by solving Equation (11) 
(Oskooee and Shabsigh, 1996): 
1
0 00 0 0kk k kS S S S                                                    (11) 
Where      for 1
1
T
ij it jt
t
S T R R

  , 0,i j k  
Each of the variables in the tX  vector is regressed on 1tX  ,    ,  , then 
the set of residuals, 
1t kX  
0tR , is obtained. Each t kX   variables is regressed on 1tX  , , 
 to obtain 
  
1t kX   ktR .   
After obtaining the eigenvalues by solving Equation (11), we can calculate both the 
 and trace max  statistics as follows: 
1
ln(1 )
q
i
i r
Trace T 
 
                                                        (12) 
And  ln(1 )rMax T     
Where 1,...,r N   are the estimates of N-r smallest eigenvalues (Oskooee and 
Shabsigh, 1996). 
 
The hypothesis is given as follows: 
r is the number of cointegrating vectors. For example, r=0 indicates that there is no 
cointegration. 
Our study tests the following three hypotheses: 
 r=0 vs r=1  
In this case, if both  and trace max  statistics are greater than the critical values, 
we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a cointegration relationship. If 
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both  and trace max 
trace
statistics are less than the critical values, we do not reject 
the null hypothesis and conclude that there is no cointegration.  
 r 1 vs r=2  
In this case, if both  and max  statistics are greater than the critical values, 
we reject the null hypothesis at most one cointegrating relationship. If both  
and 
trace
max  statistics are less than the critical values, we do not reject the null 
hypothesis that at most one cointegrating relationship. 
 r2 vs r=3 
In this case, if both  and trace max  statistics are greater than the critical values, 
we reject the null hypothesis at most two cointegrating relationships. If both  
and 
trace
max  statistics are less than the critical values, we do not reject the null 
hypothesis that at most two cointegrating relationships. 
 
The three sets of hypotheses are tested individually until one of them cannot be 
rejected. In order to use Johansen’s (1988) and Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) 
procedures, our study employs four lags because we used quarterly data in our study. 
 
3.4.3 Short-run Model 
Money demand variables move in the same direction in order to achieve long-run 
equilibrium in the long-run level. However, short-run disturbances in the money 
demand function can cause the variables to either move up or down. In order to 
understand how adjustments are taking place among the variables to achieve long-run 
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equilibrium, it is necessary to use the error correction model (ECM). An ECM 
includes an EC term which ensures the existence of a long-run relationship (Sriram, 
2002). In our study, the short-run model is applied to M0, M1, and M2 respectively. 
The EC term can be calculated using Equations (5), (6), and (7). The number of lags 
in the short-run is one less than the number of lags in the cointegration tests, thus, 
three lags is used.  
The short-run models are formulated as follows: 
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Where EC stands for error correction term and other variables are defined as 
previously.  
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Generally, all variables are integrated of the order of zero in the short-run model. 
Therefore, we can estimate Equations (13), (14), and (15) using the ordinary least 
squares. If the coefficient of the EC term is negative, we can conclude that it validates 
the significance of the long-run relationship. 
 
 
Chapter 4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Three described the data and methodology used in this research. This chapter 
presents the data description, cointegration analysis, and short-run model on the 
money demand functions. The empirical results and findings on the money demand 
functions will also discussed in the chapter.  
 
4.2 Data Description 
The period of study is from 1995Q1 through 2008Q1. The reason for choosing 
1995Q1 as the beginning period is that the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
switched to the United Nations system of national accounts, which leads different 
measurement of macroeconomic variables, such as GDP and monetary aggregates 
(Holz, 2004a). CPI is expressed in quarterly terms with the previous quarter’s value 
equal to one hundred. We subtracted one hundred from each quarter. Further, we 
adjusted nominal M0 (Currency in Circulation), M1 (M0+ Institution Demand 
Deposits), M2 (M1 + Institution Time Deposits + Household Savings Deposits + 
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Other Deposits), and nominal GDP for inflation by deflating them by the CPI. The 
real rate of one-year saving deposit is computed by one-year saving deposit rate 
minus the actual inflation rate. Finally, the real money aggregates and GDP are in 
natural logarithm form. Real rate of one-year saving deposit and real inflation are in 
levels. 
 
4.3 Hodrick-Prescott Filter 
Recall Equation (2) discussed in Chapter One, the quantity theory of money assumes 
three assumptions: since V is quite stable and changes slowly and y is fixed in a 
certain period, the increase in the money supply will lead to an increase in the price 
level. Rearranging Equation (2) yields the following:  
P=V(M/y)                                                                 (16) 
If V is quite stable, it yields a unity coefficient by regressing on . lnP ln(M/y)
Thus, we use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP)2 filter to examine whether the income 
velocity is unity. In other words, we need to test the constancy of K. K is inverse 
income velocity which equals to /k M Py 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
y y
2 The smoothing parameter of HP filter is 1600 for quarterly data. 
3 ,  and0 0 /k M P y 1 1 /k M P 2 2 /k M P . 
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Figure 4.3 K2 
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According to the graphs in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, the trends of k increase first and 
start to decrease. Therefore, k is not constant over time. Further, we employ ADF unit 
root test for ,  and  respectively to confirm income velocities are not 
constant statistically.  
0k 1k 2k
 
Table 4.1 ADF Unit Root Test Results 
Variable Test Statistics4 
k0 -1.21 
k1 -2.13 
k2 -2.20 
                                                        
4 Critical value for the test statistics is -2.92 at 5%. 
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Since the test statistics are all greater than the critical value at the 5% level of 
significance from Table 4.1, we reject the null hypothesis of k has unit root. Thus, 
three income velocities are not constant over time.  
 
A possible explanation for the non-constant income velocity is that it decreases first 
with the deepening monetization process and increases with the deepening financial 
innovations and economic stability. (China Monetary Policy Report Quarter One, p5, 
2005). Specifically, the monetization process increases the demand for money and 
financial assets to facilitate transactions and the demand for money increases at a rate 
faster than income. It makes the chain of currency in circulation longer and 
complicated. It also creates new cash flow channels among individuals. Therefore, it 
leads to the decreasing income velocity (Yi, 1991). The deepening financial 
innovations and economic growth makes the chain of currency in circulation shorter 
and accelerates the growth of income. As a result, income grows at a faster rate than 
the demand for money, which leads to the increasing income velocity (China 
Monetary Policy Report Quarter One, 2005).  
 
4.4 Unit Root Tests 
4.4.1 Graphical Descriptions of Quarterly Data 
The levels of the quarterly time series of real M0, M1, M2, real income, inflation and 
one-year saving deposit rate are denoted as RM0, RM1, RM2, RINC, INF, and DR in 
Figures 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 respectively. The first differences of the 
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quarterly time series of real M0, M1, M2, real income, inflation and one-year saving 
deposit rate are denoted as DRM0, DRM1, DRM2, DRINC, DINF, and DDR in 
Figures 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15. 
 
First, RM0, RM1, RM2, RINC, and INF appear to be nonstationary with an upward 
and downward trend in their levels. However, such behavior is less apparent for 
RINTR because the one-year saving deposit rate has been strictly controlled by the 
Chinese government for a long time.    
 
 
Figure 4.4 Level of RM0            Figure 4.5 Level of RM1 
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Figure 4.6 Level of RM2            Figure 4.7 Level of RINC 
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 Figure 4.8 Level of INF             Figure 4.9 Level of DR 
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Second, the graphs in Figures 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 exhibit similar upward trend. This 
visual plot might suggest that these level variables have a long-run relationship. We 
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employ correlation tests between LRINC and LRM0, LRM1, and LRM2 respectively. 
The pairwise correlation coefficients are 0.9178, 0.9259, and 0.9282, which reinforce 
these variables might have a long-run relationship.     
 
In contrast to the level series, all the first differenced time series fluctuate around 
different figures in Figures 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15 with constant mean 
and variances. Such behavior is consistent with that of a stationary series. Therefore, 
the stationarity of the first differenced time series suggest that they might be 
integrated of order one or I(1).  
 
 
Figure 4.10 Difference of RM0       Figure4.11 Difference of RM1 
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 Figure4.12 Difference of RM2       Figure 4.13 Difference of RINC 
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Figure 4.14 Difference of INF        Figure 4.15 Difference of DR 
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4.4.2 Unit Root Tests 
Previously we conclude that the time series might be I(1) from the visual plots. The 
ADF tests are used to confirm the integration properties of the data. Before 
implementing the ADF tests, we determine the maximum number of lags in the 
estimated ADF test regression equations. If the number of lags is too small, we may 
over-reject a null hypothesis at any chosen significance level. If the number of lags is 
too large, more parameters are estimated and the numbers of effective observations 
are reduced. Thus, there is a high probability that we reject a true null hypothesis of a 
unit root against a false alternative hypothesis, which reduces the power of tests (NG 
and Perron, 2001). First, we use , where 1/ 4max 12( /100)p T maxp  denotes the 
maximum number of lags and T is the sample size, to determine the maximum 
number of lags to be used in the unit root tests as suggested by Schwert (1989). In our 
study, we substitute T = 53 into , which gave us 
=10.24. Thus, the number of lags is 10 for the quarterly data.   
1/ 4100)max 12( /p T
1/ 4
max 12(53/100)p 
 
Second, we estimate the ADF regression with maxp . If the absolute value of the 
t-statistic for testing the last lagged difference is greater than 1.6, then we perform the 
ADF test with maxp . Otherwise, we reduce the lag length by one and repeat the 
process.       
Table 4.2 Results of Unit Root Testsa 
Variableb Calculated ADF statistic   
  Level First differences 
LRM0 -3.26[1]c -3.30[3] (***)   
LRM1 -3.51[0] -6.69[0] (*) 
LRM2 -3.33[2] -3.77[1] (**) 
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LRINC -1.84[9] -3.27[6] (***) 
INF -3.48[8] -4.35[0] (*) 
RINTR -4.00[8]  -4.53[0] (*) 
a. Critical values for the test statistics are -4.25 at 1 %, -3.55 at 5 % and -3.21 at 10 
%. (*), (**) and (***) indicate the rejection of unit roots at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level of significance respectively. They are taken from Mackinnon (1991). 
b. Logarithms of M0, M1, M2 and real income are used. Real inflation and real rate 
of one-year saving deposit are in levels.  
c. The numbers in parentheses are the number of lags used in the ADF test. 
 
The results in Table 4.2 show that the null hypothesis of unit root is not rejected in 
each level variable. The first-differenced variables have achieved stationarity, 
indicating that all variables are integrated of order one. Therefore, we can use the 
Johansen’s procedure to test for possible cointegrating relationships and all variables 
in the procedure should be differenced once. 
 
4.5 Cointegration Tests 
This section estimates the long-run relationship between monetary aggregates and 
their determinants using the Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
cointegration procedures. Cointegration implies that the cointegrating variables are 
non-stationary but the linear-relationship between them is stationary. Thus, the 
variables are cointegrated and the vectors of coefficients of the liner combination are 
cointegrating vectors. The results obtained from the unit root tests indicates ( see 
Section 4.4.2) our variables are integrated of order one, which means the long-run 
money demand function estimations in our study involve the presence of stationary 
cointegrating relationships among variables (LRM0, LRM1, LRM2, LRINC, INF, 
and RINTR).  
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Table 4.3 Cointegration Test Resultsa  
Variables in Cointe- H0  H1 λ-Max Critical Value 
grating Vectors       95% 99% 
LRM0, LRINC, 
INF& RINTR r=0 r=1  44.31* 31.46 36.65 
 r≤1 r=2   26.17** 25.54 30.34 
 r≤2 r=3 12.04 18.96 23.65 
      
LRM1, LRINC, 
INF& RINTR  r=0 r=1 29.57** 27.07 32.24 
 r≤1 r=2 21.44** 20.97 25.52 
 r≤2 r=3 6.64 14.07 18.63 
      
LRM2, LRINC, 
INF& RINTR r=0 r=1 35.78* 27.07 32.24 
 r≤1 r=2 17.21 20.97 25.52 
  r≤2 r=3 12.14 14.01 18.63 
Variables in Cointe- H0  H1 Trace Statistic Critical Value 
grating Vectors       95% 99% 
LRM0, LRINC, 
INF& RINTR r=0 r=1 91.12* 62.99  70.05 
 r≤1 r=2  46.81** 42.44 48.45 
 r≤2 r=3 20.64 25.32 30.45 
      
LRM1, LRINC, 
INF& RINTR  r=0 r=1 57.65* 47.21  54.46 
 r≤1 r=2 28.08 29.68 35.65 
 r≤2 r=3  6.64 15.41 20.04 
      
LRM2, LRINC, 
INF& RINTR r=0 r=1 67.75* 47.21 54.46 
 r≤1 r=2  31.97** 29.68 35.65 
  r≤2 r=3 14.76 15.41 20.04 
a. The cointegration tests include four lags for each variable. The estimation period 
is 1996:Q2-2008:Q1. 
b. r stands for number of cointegrating vectors.  
c. (*) and (**)indicate the rejection of null hypothesis at the 1% and 5% level of 
significance respectively 
d. Linear deterministic trend is employed. 
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The data in table 3 is obtained using the Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius’s 
(1990) cointegration procedures. It shows three cointegrating vectors and the number 
of cointegrating relationship in each cointegrating vector. 
 
For example, the first cointegrating vector in Table 4.3 includes LRM0, LRINC, INF, 
and RINTR. The null hypothesis of no cointegration relationship is rejected by both 
λ-Max and trace statistics at the 1% level of significance. The null hypothesis of r≤1 
is also rejected at the 5% level of significance. Therefore, we have two cointegrating 
vectors among those variables. 
 
The second cointegrating vector in Table 4.3 includes LRM1, LRINC, INF and 
RINTR. The null hypotheses of no cointegrating vector and at most one cointegrating 
vector are rejected by λ-Max statistics because the statistic values are greater than the 
critical values at the 5% level of significance. However, the trace statistic only rejects 
the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector at the 1% level of significance. 
Johansen and Juselius (1990) estimated the demand for money in Denmark and their 
cointegration results suggest that there are at least two but possibly three 
cointegrating vectors. The authors used the third cointegrating relationship because 
the hypothesis of proportionality between money and income seems consistent with 
the data for the three eigenvectors. In other words, we should choose the vector which 
provides correct signs of coefficients. In addition, the λ-Max statistic, in general, has 
a greater power than the trace statistic when the number of cointegrating vector is 
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either too large or small (Gu, 2004). In our study, the two eigenvectors are selected 
for the same reason. Thus, we have two cointegrating vectors among those variables. 
 
The third cointegrating vector includes LRM2, LRINC, INF and RINTR (see Table 
4.3). In contrast to the second cointegrating vector, the null hypotheses of no 
cointegrating vector and at most one cointegrating vector are rejected by trace statistic 
because the statistic values are greater than the critical values at the 1% and 5% level 
of significance. The λ-Max statistic only rejects the null hypothesis of no 
cointegrating vector. For the same reason discussed above, we conclude that there is 
one cointegrating vector among LRM2, LRINC, INF, and RINTR. 
 
After determining the cointegrating relationships of the three cointegrating vectors, 
our goal is to examine the signs of the estimated coefficients and income elasticity in 
cointegration tests.  
 
The cointegrating relationships among variables are summarized by the unnormalized 
coefficients in the cointegration tests. In order to have long-run money demand 
functions, we normalize all the coefficients on one variable in all three cointegrating 
vectors. We normalize the coefficients in each cointegrating vectors on LRM0, LRM1, 
and LRM2 respectively. For example, the coefficients variables are divided by 
102.6684 (LRM0) for the money demand function of LRM0. The following figures 
represent the normalized coefficients of variables to form the long-run money 
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demand function of LRM0. 
102.6684/102.6684=1, -9.271142/102.6684=-0.0903,  
0.979699/102.6684=0.0095, 0.397364/102.6684=0.0039 
 
Table 4.4 Cointegrating Vectors Normalized on LRM0, LRM1 and LRM2  
Vector LRM0 LRM1 LRM2 LRINC INF RINTR 
LRM0, LRINC, INF& 
RINTR 1   0.0903 -0.0095 -0.0039 
LRM1, LRINC, INF& 
RINTR   1  1.0506 -0.1865 -0.1666 
LRM2, LRINC, INF& 
RINTR     1 2.7481 -0.6918 -0.4221 
 
Thus, we have the following money demand functions: 
0 0.0903 0.0095 0.0039LRM LRINC INF RINTR                             (17) 
1 1.0506 0.1865 0.1666LRM LRINC INF RINTR                              (18) 
2 2.7481 0.6918 0.4221LRM LRINC INF RINTR                             (19) 
From the Equation (17), the income elasticity of M0 is less than one, which is not 
consistent with the quantity theory of money and pervious studies (Feltenstein and 
Farhadian 1987; Chow 1987; Hafer and Kutan 1994; Huang 1994; and Chen 1997). 
According to these studies, the larger than unity income elasticity is caused by the 
monetization process because the real money balance increase faster than income. A 
possible explanation for the lower than unity income elasticity is that people have 
access to more financial instruments included in broader measure of money as a result 
of the growth of financial services and innovations. It creates more choices for people 
to use various financial instruments, such as buying stock and funds. Thus, the 
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increase in income would be faster than the increase in narrow measure of money, 
which leads the lower than unity income elasticity (Austin, Ward, and Dalziel, 2007). 
The signs of coefficients are same as what we expected. The real income is positively 
related to the money demand functions indicating the increase in the real income 
increases people’s demand for money. Inflation and real rate of one-year saving 
deposit negatively impact the money demand functions. People tend to hold more 
physical assets rather than money with a higher inflation and an increase in domestic 
interest rate increases the opportunity cost of holding domestic money Therefore, 
people will hold less RMB when one-year saving deposit rate increases. 
 
Equation (18) and (19) indicates that the long-run income elasticities of M1 and M2 
are greater than one, 1.0506 and 2.7481 respectively. The money demand studies on 
developed countries (Hafer and Jansen 1991; Bahmani-Oskooee and Shabsigh 1996; 
and Hueng 1998) suggested that the long-run income elasticity is greater than one. 
Empirical results of the money demand studies for developing countries also provide 
greater than unity long-run income elasticity (for example, see Feltenstein and 
Farhadian, 1987; Chow, 1987; Hafer and Kutan, 1994; Huang, 1994; Chen, 1997; 
Sriram, 2002; and Narayan, 2007). For developed countries, Hueng (1998) found that 
the income elasticity is 3.432 of divisia M2 for Canada. The author suggested that the 
larger than unity income elasticity may be caused by the broader definition of money. 
For developing countries, Feltenstein and Farhadian (1987) and Hafer and Kutan 
(1994) found the income elasticity is 1.373 for M0 and 1.42 for M2 respectively in 
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China. These results imply that the velocity of money is not constant and suggest the 
evidence of monetization process. Sriram (2002) estimated the demand for money in 
Malaysia and found greater than unity income elasticity (1.0358). The long-run 
income elasticity is close to one which suggests the financial system is 
well-developed.  
 
There are two reasons for the greater than unity long-run income elasticity in China. 
First, it is caused by the monetization process because the increase in money 
aggregates is faster than the increase in income. Yi (1991) summarized five factors, 
including households, private firms, farmers, the development of free markets, and 
government, of the monetization process that explain the acceleration of the demand 
for money. Second, financial innovation may impact the demand for money and the 
long-run income elasticity. Hafer and Kutan (2003) examined the relationship 
between the money demand and income elasticity in Philippines. The authors found 
that the financial innovations have a measurable effect on M1, not on M3. In addition, 
the long-run income elasticity is 1.54. Financial innovations in China basically 
changed the economic structure and the financial system. For example, Gu (2004) 
pointed out the former led to the market to allocate resources. Thus, the demand for 
money and financial assets increased in order to facilitate transactions. This is the 
result of switching from the centrally planned economy to the market economy. Shi 
(2001) suggested that the later includes three major factors: financial institutional 
innovations, financial market innovations, and instrument innovations in banking 
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sector. Financial Institutional Innovations include the establishment of the central 
bank and four major commercial banks, including the Bank of China, the People’s 
Construction Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China. It also includes the establishment of some non-bank 
financial institutions, such as trust and investment companies. Financial market 
innovations created money market (interbank market, repurchase agreement market 
and commercial paper market), capital market (bond market and stock market), and 
the foreign exchange market. Instrument innovations in banking sector include 
liability instruments, assets instruments and off-balance-sheet business. Consequently, 
these changes caused more than proportional increase in demand for money and 
financial assets and the long-run income elasticity is greater than one.  
 
Results from previous studies (Luke Chan, Cheng and Deaves 1991; Hafer and Kutan 
1994) showed that the interest rate coefficient is positively related to the demand for 
money in China. However, in our study, the signs of the interest rate coefficients are 
consistent with the economic theory, where an increase in the domestic interest rates 
raises the opportunity cost of holding money and lowers the holding of money. A 
possible explanation for the negative signs in our study, as summarized by Gu (2004), 
is that the Chinese government adjusted the interest rates frequently to account for 
people’s expectation of inflation. The interest rate coefficients of M1 and M2 are 
0.1666 and 0.4221 respectively, which are much greater than M0’s (0.0039). Thus, 
interest rates have greater impact on M1 and M2. This also implies that if M1 and M2 
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are used as monetary targets, they will take a smaller change in interest rates to 
induce a desired change in the money demand. However, the interest rate coefficients 
in our study may not reflect the opportunity cost of holding money accurately since 
the interest rates in China have been regulated by the government for a long time. The 
regulated interest rates also do not reflect the expected inflation accurately. Gu (2004) 
points out that the regulated interest rates do not reflect the true variation in domestic 
money market. People prefer to substitute between money and real assets rather than 
between money and financial assets because people do not have many options to 
invest in interest-bearing financial assets. The coefficients of real inflation are 
congruent with the economic theory in terms of the hypothesized signs. Three money 
aggregates are proportional to changes in the real inflation.  
 
The diagnostic tests are performed to detect autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.  
Table 4.5 Diagnostic Tests 
Vector  autocorrelation heteroscedasticity 
LRM0, LRINC, INF& 
RINTR p-value=0.0765 p-value=0.0396 
LRM1, LRINC, INF& 
RINTR  p-value=0.2157 p-value=0.0341 
LRM2, LRINC, INF& 
RINTR p-value=0.5847 p-value=0.0419 
 
From Table 4.5, the p-values of autocorrelation are greater than 5%, which means we 
do not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 5% level of 
significance. The p-values of heteroscedasticity are greater than 1%, which suggests 
evidence of no heteroscedasticity at the 1% level of significance. Therefore, the 
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diagnostic tests show no problem with autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
 
4.6 Short-run Model  
4.6.1 Unrestricted model  
In order to understand how changes take place among the variables to achieve 
long-run equilibrium, it is necessary to use the error correction model (ECM). The 
ECM includes an error correction (EC) term which ensures the existence of a 
long-run relationship. First, the unrestricted short-run model is applied to M0, M1, 
and M2 respectively. If the EC term has a negative sign in our tests, then we conclude 
that the cointegrating relationship is significant. Second, the restricted model is 
applied by gradually eliminating the insignificant variables. If any model that has a 
positive EC term, it will not enter into the restricted model. Since one lag of a 
difference term equals second lag of the level, the number of lags in the short-run 
model is one less than what is applied to the cointegration tests (Sriram, 2002). 
Further, since the variables in the short-run model are generally integrated of order 
one, the OLS can be employed to estimate the short-run model.  
 
In our study, we construct the short-run model using the first difference of LRM0, 
LRM1 and LRM2 ( ,  and0LRM 1LRM 2LRM ) on the left hand side of the 
Equations (20), (21), and (22) and the first differences in LRM0, LRM1 LRM2, 
LRINC, INF, and RINTR on the right hand side of the Equations (20), (21), and (22). 
Three lags are applied to LRM0, LRM1 LRM2, LRINC, INF, and RINTR 
 59
respectively in order to match the lag length of four in the cointegration tests. The 
right hand side of Equations (20), (21), and (22) also include an EC term, which is 
calculated as LRM0, LRM1, and LRM2 minus the estimated LRM0, LRM1, and 
LRM2 in time t-1 (from the cointegrating vectors shown in Equations (17), (18), and 
(19). The EC term means the excess money demand in previous period in economic 
term (Sriram, 2002). Thus, we have the following EC terms:  
EC0=LRM0-0.093LRINC+0.0095INF+0.0039RINTR 
EC1=LRM1-1.0506LRINC+0.1865INF+0.1666RINTR 
EC2=LRM2-2.7481LRINC+0.6198INF+0.4221RINTR 
The short-run model functions are given as follows: 
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Table 4.6 Results of Unrestricted Short-run Model: DLRM0 
Unrestricted Model: DLRM0         
Estimated by OLS: Sample is 
1996Q1 to 2008Q1         
Variable Coefficient Std.Error. t-Statistic p-value 
Constant 0.004237 0.004061 1.043262 0.3040  
DLRM01 -0.020151 0.066165 -0.304556 0.7625 
DLRM02 0.006287 0.060871 0.103285 0.9183 
DLRM03 0.028315 0.057841 0.489538 0.6275 
DLRINC1 0.024722 0.005325 4.642856 0.0000  
DLRINC2 0.021317 0.005409 3.941299 0.0004 
DLRINC3 0.02047 0.004994 4.098965 0.0002 
DINF1 -0.00269 0.00275 -0.978212 0.3347 
DINF2 -0.002323 0.002791 -0.832322 0.4109 
DINF3 -0.00276 0.003316 -0.83223 0.4109 
DRINTR1 -0.00109 0.002118 -0.514572 0.6101 
DRINTR2 -0.001341 0.002151 -0.623424 0.5370  
DRINTR3 -0.002106 0.002496 -0.84388 0.4045 
ECTERM0 1.018335 0.160213 6.356122 0.0000  
a. the first difference of LRM0 is denoted as DLRM0 
b. Three lags of first difference in LRM0 are denoted as DLRM01, DLRM02, and 
DLRM03. 
c. Three lags of first difference in LRINC are denoted as DLRINC1, DLRINC2, and 
DLRINC3. 
d. Three lags of first difference in INF are denoted as DINF1, DINF2, and DINF3. 
e. Three lags of first difference in RINTR are denoted as DRINTR1, DRINTR2, and 
DRINTR3. 
f. The EC term in time t-1 is denoted as ECTERM0. 
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Table 4.7 Results of Unrestricted Short-run Model: DLRM1 
Unrestricted Model: DLRM1         
Estimated by OLS: Sample is 
1996Q1 to 2008Q1         
Variable Coefficient Std.Error. t-Statistic p-value 
C 0.037153 0.001550  23.97629 0.0000 
DLRM11 0.266113 0.105686 2.517947 0.0165 
DLRM12 0.212978 0.105283 2.02291 0.0508 
DLRM13 0.276004 0.099138 2.784031 0.0086 
DLRINC1 -0.016191 0.007643 -2.11851 0.0413 
DLRINC2 -0.018684 0.007578 -2.465518 0.0187 
DLRINC3 -0.018484 0.007369 -2.508412 0.0169 
DINF1 0.001201 0.003800  0.316001 0.7539 
DINF2 0.003884 0.003745 1.036994 0.3069 
DINF3 0.008689 0.003827 2.270399 0.0294 
DRINTR1 0.001518 0.002759 0.550179 0.5857 
DRINTR2 0.002556 0.002806 0.911 0.3685 
DRINTR3 0.006337 0.002975 2.12975 0.0403 
ECTERM1 -0.066468 0.022902 -2.902239 0.0064 
a. the first difference of LRM1 is denoted as DLRM1 
b. Three lags of first difference in LRM1 are denoted as DLRM11, DLRM12, and 
DLRM13. 
c. Three lags of first difference in LRINC are denoted as DLRINC1, DLRINC2, and 
DLRINC3. 
d. Three lags of first difference in INF are denoted as DINF1, DINF2, and DINF3. 
e. Three lags of first difference in RINTR are denoted as DRINTR1, DRINTR2, and 
DRINTR3. 
f. The EC term in time t-1 is denoted as ECTERM1. 
 
Table 4.8 Results of Unrestricted Short-run Model: DLRM2 
Unrestricted Model: DLRM2         
Estimated by OLS: Sample is 
1996Q1 to 2008Q1         
Variable Coefficient Std.Error. t-Statistic p-value 
C 0.035129 0.001013 34.66803 0.0000 
DLRM21 0.317001 0.149019 2.127253 0.0405 
DLRM22 0.091336 0.156732 0.582753 0.5638 
DLRM23 0.354519 0.14197 2.497146 0.0174 
DLRINC1 -0.02291 0.003703 -6.186976 0.0000 
DLRINC2 -0.024897 0.003561 -6.990552 0.0000 
DLRINC3 -0.022581 0.003187 -7.084508 0.0000 
DINF1 0.00653 0.002788 2.342243 0.0250 
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DINF2 0.006546 0.002814 2.326112 0.0259 
DINF3 0.007776 0.003376 2.303271 0.0273 
DRINTR1 0.003326 0.001759 1.891142 0.0669 
DRINTR2 0.0045 0.001776 2.533305 0.0159 
DRINTR3 0.00268 0.001966 1.362612 0.1817 
ECTERM2 -0.033169 0.002789 -11.89192 0.0000 
a. the first difference of LRM2 is denoted as DLRM2 
b. Three lags of first difference in LRM2 are denoted as DLRM21, DLRM22, and 
DLRM23. 
c. Three lags of first difference in LRINC are denoted as DLRINC1, DLRINC2, and 
DLRINC3. 
d. Three lags of first difference in INF are denoted as DINF1, DINF2, and DINF3. 
e. Three lags of first difference in RINTR are denoted as DRINTR1, DRINTR2, and 
DRINTR3. 
f. The EC term in time t-1 is denoted as ECTERM2. 
 
The EC term is positive as shown in Table 4.6, which did not validate the significance 
of the long-run cointegrating relationship for M0. The EC term reflects how much the 
disequilibrium is corrected in order to achieve long-run equilibrium and it has a 
negative sign to respond any deviation from long-run equilibrium. However, the 
significance of the long-run relationship is plausible because of the positive sign of 
the EC term. Therefore, DLRM0 does not enter into the restricted model. The 
constant term, DLRM13, and ECTERM1 are significant at the 1% level of 
significance (see Table 4.7). In addition, DLRM11, DLRINC1, DLRINC2, DLRINC3, 
DINF3, and DRINTR3 are significant at the 5% level of significance. All other 
variables are found to be irrelevant. The negative sign of EC term confirms the 
cointegrating relationship for M1. The data in Table 4.8 shows the constant term, 
DLRINC1, DLRINC2, DLRINC3, and ECTERM2 are significant at the 1% level of 
significance and DLRM21, DLRM23, DINF1, DINF2, DINF3, and DRINTR2 are 
significant at the 5% level of significance. The EC term also carries a negative sign, 
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which validates the significance of the long-run cointegrating relationship for M2. 
The negative sign of EC terms as shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 suggest that the 
increases in excess money demand in the previous period decrease the growth in 
demand for money in present period (Sriram, 2002).  
 
4.6.2 Restricted Model 
The restricted models of M1 and M2 are constructed by eliminating the insignificant 
variables shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. For example, DLRM12, DINF1, DINF2, 
DRINTR1, and DRINTR2 are insignificant (see Table 4.7) since their p-values are 
greater than 1% and 5% level of significance respectively. DLRM22, DRINTR1, and 
DRINTR3 are insignificant (see Table 4.8) since their p-values are also greater than 
1% and 5% level of significance respectively. After determining the insignificant 
variables, the OLS estimation is again applied to M1 and M2 respectively. The final 
results are shown in Tables 4.9 and 4.11.  
 
Table 4.9 Results of Short-run Model: DLRM1 
Restricted Model: DLRM1         
Estimated by OLS: Sample is 
1996Q1 to 2008Q1         
Variable Coefficient Std.Error. t-Statistic p-value 
C 0.038207 0.001479 25.83341 0.0000 
DLRM11 0.354455 0.081163 4.367183 0.0001 
DLRM13 0.327938 0.084082 3.900223 0.0003 
DLRINC3 -0.010689 0.005987 -1.785391 0.0814 
DINF3 0.007862 0.003119 2.520206 0.0156 
DRINTR3 0.004732 0.002482 1.906683 0.0634 
ECTERM1 -0.017036 0.010093 -1.68786 0.0989 
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The constant term, DLRM11 and DLRM13 are significant at the 1% level of 
significance (see Table 4.9). DINF3 is significant at the 5% level of significance. 
DLRINC3, DRINTR3 and ECTERM1 are significant at the 10% level of significance. 
The diagnostic tests of autocorrelation, normality and heteroscedasticity have been 
carried out. The p-value of autocorrelation, 0.015, is greater than 1%, which means 
we do not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% level of 
significance. The p-value of normality test, 0.1698, is greater than 5% level of 
significance. However, the p-value of heteroscedasticity, 0.0064, is less than 1% and 
5% level of significance. Thus, the evidence suggests the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. In the presence of heteroscedasticity, the t and F statistics in OLS 
estimation can be highly misleading and the standard errors of the OLS coefficients 
are not accurate. One way of solving this problem is to re-estimate the model with the 
presence of heteroscedasticity using the Whites’ method (see Table 4.10).  
 
Table 4.10 Results of White’s Method 
Restricted Model: DLRM1         
Estimated by OLS: Sample is 
1996Q1 to 2008Q1         
Variable Coefficient Std.Error. t-Statistic p-value 
C 0.038207 0.001446 26.42325 0.0000 
DLRM11 0.354455 0.096158 3.68618 0.0006 
DLRM13 0.327938 0.063318 5.179182 0.0000 
DLRINC3 -0.010689 0.006352 -1.682891 0.0998 
DINF3 0.007862 0.004204 1.870028 0.0685 
DRINTR3 0.004732 0.003715 1.273629 0.2098 
ECTERM1 -0.017036 0.010624 -1.603512 0.1163 
 
Interestingly, DRINTR3 and ECTERM1 are insignificant at the 10% level of 
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significance (see Table 4.10). Thus, the insignificance of the EC term does not 
validate the long-run cointegrating relationship. 
 
Table 4.11 Results of Short-run Model: DLRM2 
Restricted Model: DLRM2         
Estimated by OLS: Sample is 
1996Q1 to 2008Q1         
Variable Coefficient Std.Error. t-Statistic p-value 
C 0.035522 0.001057 33.61215 0.0000 
DLRM21 0.357945 0.145938 2.452725 0.0189 
DLRM23 0.360702 0.125635 2.871029 0.0067 
DLRINC1 -0.020759 0.003828 -5.422111 0.0000 
DLRINC2 -0.022903 0.003562 -6.429081 0.0000 
DLRINC3 -0.022001 0.003397 -6.47675 0.0000 
DINF1 0.003943 0.001668 2.363939 0.0233 
DINF2 0.007775 0.002038 3.815224 0.0005 
DINF3 0.004735 0.001706 2.774949 0.0085 
DRINTR2 0.006754 0.001664 4.057853 0.0002 
ECTERM2 -0.030707 0.00282 -10.88988 0.0000 
 
The data in Table 4.11 show all variables are significant at the 5% level of 
significance since their p-values are less than 0.05. The results are consistent with the 
unrestricted model for DLRM2. The EC term has a negative sign. 
 
Table 4.12 Diagnostic Tests 
Vector Autocorrelation Heteroscedasticity Normality ARCH  
LRM2, 
LRINC, INF& 
RINTR 
p-value=0.400 p-value=0.062 p-value=0.613 p-value=0.480
 
Table 4.12 results show the model does not have autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, 
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normality and ARCH.  
 
 
Chapter 5 Conclusions and Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
This study tests the positive or negative relationship and estimate the long-run 
relationship between real M0, M1, and M2 and their determinants, namely real 
income, real inflation, and real rate of one-year saving deposit in China over the 
period 1995Q1 to 2008Q1. We employed the Johansen’s (1988) and Johansen and 
Juselius’s (1990) procedures to achieve our research objectives. Further, we also 
employed the unrestricted and restricted short-run model to test whether the error 
term is negative to validate the significance of the long-run relationship using the 
OLS estimation.  
 
5.2 Research Findings 
First, we used the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to examine whether the income 
velocity is unity. The data in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 show the non-constant income 
velocities over time with a downward trend followed by an upward trend. In addition, 
the ADF unit root tests also confirm that the income velocities are not constant since 
the test statistics are all greater than the critical value at the 5% level of significance. 
The downward trend of the income velocity is caused by the monetization process 
because it leads to an increase in demand for money at a faster rate than income. The 
deepening financial innovations and economic growth accelerate the growth of 
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income and make income grows at a rate faster than the demand for money. Therefore, 
the income velocity has an upward trend. The non-constant income velocity is not 
consistent with the quantity theory of money; however, some previous studies have 
shown the non-constant income velocity in both developing and developed countries 
(see for example, Hafer and Jansen’s (1991) study on money demand in the US; 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Shabsigh (1996) in Japan; Hueng (1998) in Canada; and 
Chow (1987); Feltenstein and Farhadian (1987); and Hafer and Kutan (1994) in 
China). Hafer and Jansen (1991) used two different data period and interest rates in 
estimating the money demand functions in the US. The authors found that the income 
elasticities of M1 and M2 in the two data period with different interest rate are 
non-constant. The income elasticities of M1 are less than one and the income 
elasticities of M2 are greater than one. The non-constant income elasticities might be 
caused by the financial innovations and the monetization process during the two data 
period. Hueng (1998) employed the cash-in-advance model to estimate the demand 
for money in Canada. The author found that the income elasticity of divisia M2 is 
larger than one (3.432) and suggests that broader measure of money may produce 
higher income elasticity of the money demand function. Feltenstein and Farhadian 
(1987) and Hafer and Kutan (1994) suggested that the large than unity income 
velocity in China is caused by the monetization process, which leads to demand for 
money increases at a rate faster than income. In addition, Yi (1991) identified five 
channels of monetization process in China which impact the demand for money on 
different sectors, such as the household, the government, the private enterprises, and 
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the farms. Further, the non-constant income velocity is not only caused by the 
monetization process, but also by the financial innovations, which also impact the 
demand for money in China. In general, the financial innovations in China changed 
the economic structure and the financial system. The former switched from the 
centrally planned economy to the market economy and the later includes financial 
institutional innovations, financial market innovations, and instrument innovations in 
banking sector. Thus, it is not surprising that we have non-constant income velocity. 
 
Second, before we performed the cointegration tests, the graphical descriptions of the 
quarterly data and the ADF unit root tests were applied to each series to test whether 
all series are integrated of order one since the cointegration tests require all series 
must be integrated of order one. The graphical descriptions of the quarterly data 
include both level and first difference of each series, namely real M0, M1, M2, real 
income, inflation, and one-year saving deposit rate. The level series of real M0, M1, 
M2, and real income exhibit a similar trend, indicating that we might have a long-run 
relationship among those series and the first difference series suggest that all variable 
might be integrated of order one. Further, the ADF unit root tests confirm that all 
variables are integrated of order one since the null hypothesis of unit root is not 
rejected at each level variable and rejected at each first difference variables at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level of significance respectively. 
 
Third, the Johansen’s (1988) and Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) cointegration 
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procedures were used to determine the long-run cointegrating relationships between 
real M0, M1, and M2 and their determinants. In the cointegration tests, we have three 
sets of cointegrating vectors with LRM0, LRM1, and LRM2 as dependent variable 
and the same independent variables in each cointegrating vector respectively. The 
first and second cointegrating vectors (LRM0 and LRM1) have two cointegrating 
relationships and the third one has one cointegrating relationship. The signs of 
coefficients are consistent with our expectation. In addition, the income elasticity of 
LRM0 (0.0903) is less than one, indicating the increase in income would be faster 
than the increase in narrow measure of money. In contrast to LRM0, the income 
elasticities of LRM1 (1.0506) and LRM2 (2.7481) are both larger than one, which 
suggest the evidence of the monetization process and the financial innovations. 
Further, the interest rate coefficient of LRM2, 0.4421, is greater than that of LRM0 
and LRM1. The larger interest rate coefficient of LRM2 means that it will take a 
smaller change in interest rate to influence the demand for money. In addition, 
previous studies (see Hafer and Kutan, 1994 and Luke Chan, Cheng and Deaves, 
1991) have shown that the interest rate coefficient has a positive impact on the 
demand for money, which is not consistent with our finding. The data periods in those 
studies were from 1952-1988 and 1952-1987, and the interest rates were controlled 
by the PBC and were not adjusted frequently. However, our study data include 
1995Q1-2008Q1 in which the PBC adjusted the interest rates more frequently to 
account for people’s expectation of inflation. The negative sign of inflation implies 
that people tend to hold more real assets rather than holding money when inflation 
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increases. In addition, the inflation coefficient of LRM2 (0.6918) is greater than that 
of LRM0 (0.0095) and LRM1 (0.1865), which means the inflation has a large impact 
on M2. In other words, any increase or decrease in M2 may influence inflation 
stronger than M0 and M1. Thus, M2 might be effective in stabilizing inflation rate.      
 
Fourth, the unrestricted short-run model was applied to M0, M1, and M2 respectively 
using the OLS estimation. We found that the EC term of M0 is positive, which did not 
validate the significance of the long-run cointegrating relationship for M0. However, 
the EC terms of M1 and M2 are negative and significant at the 1% level of 
significance, which ensures the existence of the long-run relationships. The restricted 
model was applied to M1 and M2 by eliminating the insignificant variables from the 
unrestricted model. M1 was not included in the restricted model since the EC term is 
positive. By using the OLS estimation, the EC term of M1 is negative but is not 
significant at the 10% level of significance. Compared to M1, M2 has a negative EC 
term and is significant at the 1% level of significance. The EC coefficient term shows 
that the last period disequilibrium is corrected by approximately 3.1% a quarter. The 
negative EC term not only implies a proportion of previous disequilibrium in the 
demand for money is corrected in the current period, it also validate the significance 
of cointegration relationship obtained from the cointegration tests. In addition, the 
diagnostic tests show no presence of autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, normality 
and ARCH. As a result, M2 has the best performance in our estimation process. 
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5.3 Policy Implications and Limitations 
China started using the broad measure of money to conduct monetary policy in 1994. 
However, China abandoned money targeting and has started using interest rate 
targeting as the intermediate goal in conducting monetary policy since 2004. Since 
the inflation is still high under interest rate targeting, monetary targeting may be used 
again to stabilize inflation. The following section explains that three policy 
implications obtained from our research findings. In addition, there are three issues 
should be carefully considered although they are not obtained from the research 
findings. Further, three limitations are summarized afterwards.  
 
Our study suggests that there is a long-run relationship between the broad measure of 
money (M2) and its determinants. However, the long-run relationships for M0 and 
M1 are plausible. Thus, M2 would be an appropriate target in conducting monetary 
policy rather than using M0 and M1. Our result is also consistent with Hafer and 
Kutan (1994), Huang (1994), and Gu (2004) and they suggest that M2 is a better 
indicator in conducting monetary policy because there is a stable long-run 
relationship for M2. Further, in the presence of the fast development of financial 
markets, such as money market, bond market and stock market, the narrow money 
aggregate (M0) is no longer an appropriate target to determine the money supply 
because those markets impact the demand for money much more than before in China. 
For example, firms may borrow from the stock market rather than borrowing from 
banks. However, M0 does not account for the money in the stock market, it only 
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includes the currency in circulation. If M2 is selected as monetary target, then it 
should grow no more than 37% to control inflation under 10%. Further, our results 
suggest that the monetization process and the financial innovations also impact the 
demand for money in China. In order to have a stable growth in monetary aggregates, 
the monetization process and the financial innovations should be carried out step by 
step.  
 
As discussed in our research findings, a smaller change in interest rates influences the 
demand for money in China. During 1990s, bank loans borrowed by the state-owned 
enterprises were not sensitive to the changes in interest rates because they did not 
have to repay their loans. In addition, customers had no access to bank loans, which 
means their spending was also not sensitive to the changes in interest rates. However, 
more private firms and customers have access to bank loans and stated-owned 
enterprises have to repay their loans in the last few years (Green, 2005). Thus, the 
demand for money in these sectors is sensitive to the changes in interest rates and 
interest rates have a greater impact on the demand for money in China than before. In 
order to influence the demand for money, the PBC should know to what extent 
households, private firms and stated-owned enterprises are sensitive to interest rate 
changes. There is an important factor that should be considered since bank loans are 
more accessible to households and private firms. Poor credit rating system and 
asymmetric information increase credit risk. Thus, banks should be able to decrease 
credit risk by having sound credit rating system.  
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Three important factors should be addressed when considering the Chinese money 
demand. First, the huge capital inflows into China require a huge demand for money. 
The huge capital inflows may cause increase in inflation. On the other hand, the 
demand for money may decrease suddenly if huge capital outflow takes place. For 
example, the current global financial crisis may force many foreign investors to 
decrease their investments and take capitals out of China to absorb losses elsewhere 
during the financial crisis. Thus, in order to have a stable increase or decrease in 
monetary aggregate, the PBC should monitor the sudden increase or decrease in 
capital movements. Second, substantial increase in exports and imports may impact 
the demand for money in China since China has become a member of WTO. For 
example, exporters exchange their receipts denominated in foreign currency to RMB 
at commercial banks, then commercial banks hand over the foreign currency to the 
PBC in exchange for the assets denominated in RMB on their balance sheets. As a 
result, the money supply increases, which may increase inflation. Third, the 
movements of exchange rate may impact firms’ demand for RMB because they 
convert foreign exchange earnings to RMB based on the expectations of future 
appreciation of RMB. Further, since the restrictions on domestic holdings of foreign 
currency have been gradually loosened, the demand for RMB may also be impacted 
based on the future appreciation or depreciation of the RMB. This implies the PBC 
should be able to stabilize the exchange rate and revalue the RMB gradually in order 
to prevent a sudden increase or decrease in the demand for RMB.   
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There are three limitations in our study: 
i. The first limitation is the accuracy of the data. The accuracy of the data is 
questioned by Holz (2004b). The author questioned and challenged the 
accuracy of China’s GDP. The official annual GDP is calculated differently 
annually without much consistency. In addition, the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China does not explain explicitly the calculation mechanism 
when publishing the official data. The significant variations of data indicate 
that the National Bureau of Statistics of China is unwilling or uncapable in 
explaining the validity of their estimations and reports.   
ii. The one-year saving deposit rate may not be an appropriate variable to 
represent the opportunity cost of holding money. For example, Austin, Ward, 
and Dalziel (2007) suggest that real interest rates are not allowed to change 
frequently and movements are not large and indistinguishable from the 
negative inflation. In addition, the data period is not long in our study. 
Therefore, the sign and the coefficient of the real interest rate may be 
sensitive to the data length.  
iii. Divisia monetary aggregates may provide more stable long-run relationship 
than simple sum monetary aggregates do in estimating the money demand 
function. Dahalan, Sharma, and Sylwester (2005) found that there are more 
variables can be omitted in the estimation when using simple sum monetary 
aggregates. However, when using divisia monetary aggregates, there is only 
one variable fails to have a long-run relationship with money.  
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5.4 Recommendations for future research  
Since China has switched from the pegged exchange rate system to managed floating 
regime, the exchange rate may have some influences on the demand for money in 
China. Although such influences may not appear fast, it will impact the Chinese 
money demand sooner or later. Therefore, the exchange rate might be used in the 
future research in order to test its relationship with the money demand function and to 
find any evidence of currency substitution.  
 
The period that the present study covers is not long enough for conducting reliable 
tests on structural breaks. The future research might use the longer data period to 
capture the impact of the structural break. However, the measurements of 
macroeconomic variables have changed since the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China switched to the United Nations system of national accounts. Thus, future 
research should consider the inconsistency of the data and should transform the data 
to have the same measurement. 
 
Future research may use divisia monetary aggregates in estimating the Chinese 
money demand functions if they are collectable. Thus, the research findings may be 
more accurate in the use of conducting monetary policy.  
 
Finally, the one-year saving deposit rate may be replaced by other interest rate, such 
as Treasury bill rates and government bond rates, to see whether we will have 
 76
different conclusions on which monetary aggregate should be used in conducting 
monetary policy in China. 
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